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ABSTRACT 
African-American geographic mobility plays a central and somewhat contradictory role 
in Robert Margo's Race and Schooling in the South. 1880-1950. [1990 ] On the one hand, it 
is the solution to what Margo calls "Myrdal's Paradox." Blacks, in Margo's view, forced 
white school boards to spend at least some money on black schools after disfranchisement by 
threatening to deprive white planters of a labor force if black schools were too terrible. On 
the other hand, geographic mobility was the result of that solution to Myrdal's Paradox. 
Blacks who migrated north, Margo showed, were likely to be relatively well educated. In an 
article that accompanied his book, Margo elaborated a model of school board action in the 
legally segregated, post-disfranchisement South and briefly examined a small amount of data 
that he claimed was "broadly consistent with the model." [1991, p. 67.] In this paper, I 
consider extensive evidence, largely from the period before 1910, that bears on the first part 
of Margo's argument. Since almost none of that evidence corroborates his thesis, I conclude 
that explanations other than black geographic mobility must account for the pattern of 
support for black schools in the South during the era of legalized segregation. 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Social Science History Association
Convention in 1991. I want to thank Shawn Everett Kantor for valuable comments. 
WHY WERE THERE BLACK SCHOOLS IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH? 
THE EXIT EXPLANATION RECONSIDERED 
In An American Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal wondered why, after African-Americans 
were largely disfranchised in the South around the turn of the century, "the principle of the 
Negroes' right to public education was not renounced altogether." [1944, p. 888.] Writing 
in the midst of the anti-Nazi war, the Swedish social democrat found the most appealing 
answer to be that white southerners so deeply shared the fundamental American belief in 
egalitarianism that, however racist, they could not engage in absolute discrimination. To 
deprive blacks of education altogether would have been too unfair, too 
un-American--stump rhetoric about education spoiling good field hands to the contrary 
notwithstanding. [Preston, 1894, p. 221 for the rhetoric.] "The American Creed, backed by 
the Constitution, showed itself strong enough not to allow the sacred principle of public 
education to succumb," Myrdal grandly concluded. 
Margo considered this ideological explanation "redundant." As he pointed out, courts 
intervened under both state and federal constitutional provisions to insure at least a basic 
level of education for southern blacks, and they simply would not have allowed a total 
destruction of black education. Northern philanthropists and southern bureaucrats 
encouraged and partially funded better black schools. Southern white self-interest in 
slightly more literate cooks, tenants, and farm laborers implied some, though not much 
support for African-American schools. But Margo preferred an explanation that allowed the 
masses of blacks at least an indirect role in preserving their educational opportunities. 
Following Charles Tiebout and Albert Hirschman, Margo suggested that blacks could employ 
the last weapon of the powerless--exit. [Tiebout, 1956; Hirschman, 1970.] "The final 
resolution of Myrdal's paradox," Margo declared, "is the mobility model. Black families 
would leave an area if the provision of schools for their children were seriously threatened." 
[1990, p. 48.] "Exit, in the case of segregated schools, was a partial substitute for political 
voice." [1991, p. 62.]2
Although in both his book and his article, he qualified these strong assertions, admitting 
that equalization did not begin to take hold in the Deep South before the 1920s, and that it 
required concerted court actions by the NAACP in the 1930s and 40s to make P/essy v. 
Ferguson's "equal but separate" jibe a reality, Margo's mobility thesis still deserves attention. 
2 For a similar argument about the effect of exit on racial violence, see Tolnay and Beck,
1992. 
How effective was exit in this case? Must Myrdal's thesis be dismissed out of hand, in 
keeping with the more skeptical, sardonic, despairing view of race relations typical of the 
fin-de-siecle malaise? Should explanations that stress the actions or potential actions of 
judges, philanthropists, and bureaucrats--those sixties heroes--be deemphasized as unsuited 
to the present knowingly cynical moment? Are governmental actions that restructure rules, 
such as southern disfranchisement, inevitably ineffective in America, because exit can act as 
an "invisible hand" to restore a new equilibrium? Do attempts at amelioration, such as 
increasing expenditures on black schools in an effort to prevent the labor force from 
migrating, generally lead to consequences unintended by their proponents--in this case, 
raising the job qualifications of potential migrants, and, therefore, their migration rates? In 
the largest sense, can politics, broadly defined to include court actions, make a difference, 
or is it largely an epiphenomenon? 
Margo's model of local government discrimination added taxes and government spending 
to a constant returns production function model in which capital was white and labor was 
black. Laborers enjoyed no political power, but could move costlessly from community to 
community within each state. School boards, perfectly reflecting the white community's 
undifferentiated interest, preferred to maximize taxes on blacks and minimize services 
provided to them, but they could not because of implicit or explicit black threats to leave. 
If laborers had enough choices of places to which to go, racial discrimination by 
government, which Margo defined as spending on African-Americans less than they paid in 
taxes, must have been limited [1991, pp. 62-65]. 
The assumptions underlying this model are so flawed and unrealistic as to render it 
largely useless. First, Margo assumed that all labor was nonwhite, when, in fact, two-thirds 
of the tenant farmers in the eleven ex-Confederate states in 1910 were white [U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1914, p. 297]. Because white labor could substitute for black labor, there was 
much Jess incentive to hold black labor in a community than Margo suggested. 
Furthermore, treating all whites as a homogeneous employer class hides the fact that some 
whites, those who did not employ any black laborers, might well have been indifferent to 
black out-migration. And others, landless white farmers or artisans, might actually have 
benefited economically if their black competitors were to leave. Second, contrary to the 
spirit of Tiebout's mobility hypothesis, Margo assumed that every African-American 
household had identical tastes for education, which Margo treated as the exemplary 
government good. In Tiebout's world, individuals with different tastes sort themselves into 
geographically distinct groups in order to consume the packages of taxes and services 
offered by different local governmental units that best satisfy their preferences. In Margo's, 
since every ..A�frican-�A .. merican v1anted the same package, every government, in equiiibrium, 
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should have supplied it. But, in fact, there were wide variations in expenditures on black 
schools, both within and between southern states. (See Table 3, below.) 
Third, Margo assumed that white employers could bargain with black laborers only by 
proposing a level of taxes and services, and that blacks could respond only by staying or 
leaving. But surely individual employers could have varied wages or working conditions, 
and at some level, to some individual blacks, such incentives would have outweighed 
county-to-county differences in school quality. And blacks could have petitioned, cajoled, 
reasoned with, or struck against local whites in order to obtain better schools, or, 
particularly during the I 920s and 1930s, they could have sought help from northern 
philanthropic foundations and state education departments. [Newby, 1973, 92-93.] Ever 
since the Civil War, moreover, blacks had built or helped to build and maintain schools and 
teachers for themselves. [Anderson, 1988.] In other words, whites did not have to act only 
through government in order to try to maintain a supply of labor, and blacks, though 
deprived of the vote, were not entirely powerless, stripped of every weapon except exit. 
Fourth, blacks were not the only people disfranchised in the South, nor were they only 
ones to suffer educational disadvantages or to be geographically mobile [Kousser, 1974 and 
I 980]. Poor whites, especially those from districts whose schools had little or no urban, 
railroad, mining, manufacturing, or plantation wealth to tax, lacked the political power to 
guarantee their children adequate schools, and many of them appear to have migrated in the 
direction of better schools. [Whitfield, 1904, p. 11; Martin, 1907, pp. 13-14.] As Tables 1-
3, below, attest, black and white interstate mobility within and from the South was both 
large and variable, especially after 1910, and the state with the highest level of school 
expenditures on whites after 1915, Florida, also had by far the highest white net in­
migration. Conversely, North Carolina, which had the lowest level of expenditures on white 
schools of any southern state for which data is available from 1880 to 1920, consistently lost 
white population up to that date. (See Tables 1-3.) If school boards responded to the 
departures of whites as Margo suggests that the boards did to those of blacks, then the ratio 
of spending on white schools to spending on black schools, as well as of comparative school 
terms and other indicators of educational quality, should have remained high, not declined, 
as it did in many areas after I 920. 
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Not only is his model seriously flawed, but Margo's evidence is also extremely sparse. 3
For Louisiana parishes (counties) in 1920, 1930, and 1940, Margo regressed the change in 
the length of the school year for blacks on the one-period-lagged change in the percentage 
of the total population that was black in the parish and a dummy for the 1930s. If the 
percentage of blacks went down disproportionately in a particular parish in one decade, he 
reasoned, then white school officials should have responded by disproportionately increasing 
the length of the school term in the parish during the next decade. The results are at best 
mixed--a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the 1920s, but a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for the 1930s. 
The dependent variable that Margo employed is also unsatisfactory. The inequality 
between black and white terms was never nearly as wide as that between expenditures on 
teachers' salaries or school building and upkeep. In Louisiana in 1885, for instance, the 
length of a school term for whites in an average parish was 4. 71 months, and for blacks, 
4.66 months, a ratio of 1.01:1. Expenditures per enrolled child in the same year, however, 
amounted to $5.42 for whites, but only $2.13 for blacks, a ratio of 2.54:1. In South Carolina 
in 1910, the ratio of white to black term lengths was 1.74:1, while that between white to 
black expenditures for teachers' salaries was 5.26:1. In Alabama in 1899, the ratios were 
1.18:1 and 2.58:1; in Texas in 1910, 1.06:1 and 1.95:1. One school with a four or five month 
term might have a hundred students in an ungraded class jammed into a ramshackle wooden 
hut and taught by a person who barely knew more than his or her students. [Wish, 1964, p. 
197.] Another might have graded, manageably small classes, a decent brick building, and an 
experienced, certificated teacher. Surely a black or white parent contemplating whether or 
not to move would evaluate more about the schools than the lengths of their terms. 
Expenditure measures would capture all of these facets--term length, building and 
maintenance, student/teacher ratio, and teacher quality, at least insofar as that quality was 
3 Margo also �eprints data on the estimated expenditures for black schools and the estimated
taxes that blacks paid for schools in the eleven ex-Confederate states and three border states 
from a 1973 dissertation. [Smith, 1973]. In fact, full tax and spending data is available by race 
for only one of the fourteen states for the whole period that Smith covers, 1870-1910, and 
Smith's estimation methods are wildly speculative. In any case, a small difference between the 
amount expended on black schools and the amount of taxes that they paid is compatible with a 
number of models besides Margo's exit thesis. [Kousser, 1980]. 
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reflected in the salary received--while the term length would measure only a small part of 
the educational production function.4
Margo's independent variable is also problematic, since the black percentage of the 
population is a function not only of black, but also of white migration patterns. If whites as 
well as blacks moved to richer areas in search of better educational opportunities, then the 
black percentage in a county might have remained constant over time, even if Margo's 
model is fundamentally correct. If whites moved into a county to get better schools or for 
other reasons, then the black percentage might have declined, even if no blacks immigrated. 
If, for a whole complex of reasons, only some having to do with education, a higher 
percentage of blacks than of whites stayed in a county, then the black percentage would 
have increased, even though more blacks than whites might have been dissatisfied with their 
schools. 
A closer look at Tables 1-3 suggests that changes in school expenditures were not very 
important determinants of mobility rates. Texas, with the highest level of spending on 
blacks from 1890 on, lost black population in every decade from the 1880s to the 1930s. If 
African-Americans in other southern states had been motivated solely by a desire to 
improve their educational opportunities, they would have moved to Texas, swamping the 
outflow from Texas to the North and Far West. Educational expenditures for blacks in 
Louisiana were disproportionately low for the region after 1890, but its out-migration was 
comparatively moderate. Schools for whites in South Carolina improved dramatically from 
1915 to 1930, but whites still left in droves. Although the available statistics are too 
fragmentary to enable one to subject the relationships between migration and school 
expenditures to more systematic statistical analysis at the state level (because states did not 
always segregate their published statistics as faithfully as they did their schools), the overall 
lack of pattern is clear. 
(Tables 1-3 about here.) 
One more facet of Table 3 should be pointed out. In most areas for most periods, the 
level of black expenditures per student did not actually decline absolutely, but only relative 
4 Although comparing expenditures across races may be somewhat problematic, because such
expenditures are functions of the amount of racial discrimination against teachers, as well as 
against students,�such considerations are irrelevant here, for .. the comparisons are within races, 
not between them. Furthermore, the mobility thesis is much more plausible for teachers than 
for parents. Before the days of civil service protection, tenure, and benefits that accrued over 
time, teachers were free to respond purely to salary incentives, and school boards were 
unfettered in being able to discharge teachers who were "worth" less than they were paid. 
Contemporary school administrators were well aware of such matters. See, e.g., Pound, 1910, 
pp. 133-34. 
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to that for whites.5 If blacks compared the quality of their schools with those of whites in
the same area, then the relevant dependent variable should be relative racial expenditures. 
If blacks compared current conditions to those in their own schools at an earlier period, or 
to those of contemporary black schools in other places, then the dependent variable should 
be the level of segregated expenditures or changes in that level. In the analysis below, I 
assume, as Margo implicitly did, that the principal objects of comparison for blacks and 
whites were schools for their own race.6
Below the state level, it is possible to analyze statistics for seven of the eleven ex­
Confederate states.7 Tables 5-7 and 9-12 have a common format and are based on all the
segregated expenditure data that is available at approximately five-year intervals from 1880 
to 1910 for the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, 
and Virginia. Table 8 substitutes a term-length dependent variable in the state, Alabama, 
where that information is most plentiful. Instead of changes in the black population 
percentage, I have used those in the number of schoolage children enrolled, separately for 
each race, as a much more direct measure of migration due to educational concerns. It also 
avoids the relative migration problem mentioned above. Instead of the length of the school 
term, I have focused on expenditures, or, when this is unavailable, on by far the largest 
component of spending, that for teachers' salaries. To avoid overemphasizing small counties 
or those with few blacks, I have divided the enrollment changes by the earlier year's 
enrollment and weighted each regression by the square root of the same enrollment figure. 
The years before 1910 provide a better test of Margo's thesis than those after 1920 for 
three reasons: First, disparities in expenditures were growing rapidly in the earlier era; 
whereas, those disparities were reduced later, particularly after 1930. If black parents were 
ever going to act as Margo suggests that they did, it should have been at the nadir of 
discrimination, not when spending inequalities were being alleviated by rapidly increasing 
5 How real levels of expenditures changed is very difficult to determine. Applying any
generally available cost of living index to the rural South, especially to the cost of buildings 
and salaries of people who nearly always were only part-time teachers, seems an exercise less 
in futility than in fiction. 
6 Had blacks' decisions to move. depended on..interracial comparisons, Margo's thesis would be 
so obviously at variance with the facts of migration as to be unworthy of consideration. As 
Tables 1-3 show, the greatest amounts of black emigration from the South came when the 
trend of expenditures was toward racial equalization. 
7 I have not yet completed the task of converting the massive amounts of data from the 254
Texas counties into machine-readable form. 
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relative funding for black schools. Second, once the pattern of educational discrimination 
settled in, school boards should have been less easily convinced that black decisions to 
migrate would depend on the quality of their schools. If blacks stayed when their schools 
were miserable, why should white school boards believe later that improving schools at a 
more rapid rate would prevent African-Americans from leaving?8 Third, during the latter
part of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth, black education in the 
South was so poor, especially in the rural areas, that even dramatic improvements would not 
have equipped young African-Americans to migrate north. While it is possible that during 
the 1920s and after, the actions of white school officials in improving black schools 
unintentionally contributed to black migration out of the South, this unintended consequence 
seems much less likely in the years before World War I. Thus, it is to this earlier period, 
not the 1920s or later, that the Margo mobility thesis should apply most strongly. 
I have operationalized the thesis in three different sets of equations.9 In the first set,
which I will refer to as "Equations A", changes in enrollment from the first to the second 
period were assumed to be reactions to expenditure levels in the first period. In other 
words, people observed the amount spent in the schools where they were, and if they were 
dissatisfied, they subsequently moved to areas of greater spending. This variable stresses the 
actions of parents and children, not officials, and is therefore the least related to Margo's 
model, which emphasizes the actions of school boards. If Margo's thesis is correct, the signs 
of the coefficients of the independent variables in these equations, EXB, should be positive. 
In the second set ("Equations B"), changes in expenditures from the second to the third 
period are hypothesized to be a function of changes in enrollments from the first to the 
second period. School boards, in this model, responded to extraordinarily large drops in 
enrollment by increasing spending more rapidly than the average county did. Margo would 
8 For a similar argument used to dismiss the comparative regional quality of schools for blacks
as a factor in the "Great Migration" of blacks from the U.S. South to the North, see Higgs, 
1976, 337. 
9 Like Margo, I have used bivariate OLS regression equations to test his hypothesis.
Naturally, other factors than schooling entered into the decisions of parents and school boards. 
But if parents could signal their satisfaction only by moving or staying, and if school boards 
would change black expenditure levels only in response to parents' mobility decisions, then the 
influence of other variables.on mobility ought to have made no difference. Suppose the model 
is correct and black parents observed that a local school board has raised spending levels, or 
that it was spending a high amount on black schools, relative to school boards elsewhere. 
Then, regardless of why the board had acted, black families should have remained in the area, 
or moved to it. Or suppose that a school board observed blacks leaving, for whatever reason. 
Then it should have raised black expenditures, if it were acting in accordance with Margo's 
hypothesis. For this simple theory, then, a bivariate regression is entirely appropriate. 
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expect the coefficients of ENCB in these equations to be negative. The third set ("Equations 
C"), which has the same rationale as the second, but assumes a shorter reaction time, is 
based on the supposition that the school board set the expenditure level in the second period 
in response to changes in enrollment between the first and second periods. Again, the signs 
of ENCB should be negative if the model is correct. If enrollment fell disproportionately, 
expenditures should have risen to disproportionately high levels. All three sets of equations 
seem to me to be plausible representations of facets of Margo's mobility model. In all 
equations, the values of the coefficients based on the white schools should have been less 
than or of opposite sign from those for black schools, because white expenditures were 
generally rising at much more rapid rates than those for blacks during this period, and 
because many whites could express themselves through a political "voice," rather than just 
through a nonpolitical "exit." 
(Table 4 about here.) 
Because Margo focused on data from Louisiana, let us start there. 1 O Table 5 reveals
that the coefficients for blacks are often of the predicted signs, but are statistically 
significant less than half of the time. The greater the expenditure in a parish (EXB), the 
greater the increase in enrollment over the next five years in that parish, relative to other 
parishes.1 1  The less the increase in enrollment over the previous five years (ENCB), the
greater the expenditure level, again relative to that in other parishes. But, contrary to 
expectation, the greater the increase in enrollment over the previous five years (ENCB), the 
greater the increase in expenditure over the next five years (EXCB). Of the fourteen slope 
coefficients (C) for the black equations, only six are significant at the 0.05 level for a one­
tailed test, five in the predicted direction, and one in the other direction. Three of the five 
concern black parental action, not school board action. Moreover, the signs of 
nine of the fourteen pairs of equations for the whites are the same as those for the blacks, 
though only one of the fourteen is statistically significant. 
(Table 5 about here.) 
Louisiana fits Margo's hypothesis better than the other states do. In Mississippi, only 
one of the twenty-two slope coefficients is significant, and eight of the eleven for blacks 
1 O The information available in reports of the southern state superintendents of education
varied from year to year. Although I attempted to use data from years divisible by five, in 
some cases, that was impossible. I have consequently substituted the nearest year in which the 
requisite data was printed. 
11 This parallels the finding in Tolnay and Beck, 1992, I 12-13.
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have the "wrong" signs. (See Table 6.) Twelve of the twenty-eight signs for expenditures 
in Alabama are significant, but only four of the fourteen for blacks are both significant 
and in the predicted direction. Three of the coefficients for blacks are significant, but in 
the wrong direction, and nine of the fourteen pairs of equations for whites and blacks have 
coefficients with the same signs. (See Table 7.) Alabama is also the only state with a 
sufficiently long series of term length data for this period to make analysis useful. Only 
two of the eighteen equations to predict term lengths in Alabama have significant 
coefficients (one for whites and one for blacks), and both go counter to Margo's prediction. 
(See Table 8.) Moving east and then north, the box scores for significant coefficients in 
the predicted directions are two of sixteen for Georgia, one of sixteen for Florida, five of 
thirty-four for North Carolina, and two of sixteen for Virginia. In the forty-one of the 
equations that relate to blacks in these four states, there are only eleven statistically 
significant coefficients, and five of the eleven are in the wrong direction. Of the forty-one 
pairs of equations for blacks and whites in the four states, twenty-five pairs have the same 
signs. (See Tables 9-12.) 
(Tables 6-12 about here.) 
Overall, the scorecards are unimpressive on the ninety regressions for each race. For 
blacks, twenty-six equations have statistically significant slope coefficients, but eleven of 
them have signs opposite to those that Margo's model implies. Sixty-four have signs that 
cannot be distinguished from zero. For whites, the comparable totals are ten, twelve, and 
sixty-eight.12 In the case of neither race does the relation between migration and
expenditure changes seem impressive, and, to the extent that there was any relation at all, it 
was similar for people of both races. Apparently, other factors, such as comparative 
economic opportunity, considerably outweighed the quality of schools in migration 
decisions, as traditional models predict. (E.g., Fligstein, 1981.) At least on this evidence, it 
was not the threat of exit, but other considerations that caused school boards to continue 
and even at times to make improvements in black public education after disfranchisement. 
12 Unweighted versions of the same equations yield the following numbers of statistically
significant and correct, ,statistically significant and,incorrect, and non-significant coefficients: 
for blacks, eighteen, eight, and sixty-four; for whites, nine, nineteen, and sixty-two. For 
equations using raw enrollment changes, rather than enrollment changes divided by enrollment 
in the first year, the analogous totals are 11, 5, and 74 for blacks, and 12, 16, and 62 for 
whites. The story is thus essentially the same for these 180 regressions as for the 90 weighted 
regressions: Margo's model fits well a fifth or less of the time for blacks, and even though it 
was not meant to apply to whites, it fits them well a tenth or more of the time. 
9 
Among the most important of those other considerations was undoubtedly the threat of 
legal action under the Fourteenth Amendment and various state laws and constitutional 
provisions that usually dated from Reconstruction and often remained in southern state 
constitutions even after disfranchisement. Adopted in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment, of 
course, required that no state deny any person "the equal protection of the laws. " Some state 
constitutions contained "equal benefit" clauses, such as Article 13 of the 1875 Alabama 
constitution: "The General Assembly shall establish, organize and maintain a system of 
public schools throughout the State for the equal benefit of the children thereof . . . .  "13
Even though the extreme racist 1901 Alabama constitutional convention deleted the equal 
benefit clause and significantly weakened the protections for black education, Article IV of 
the new state constitution did require that, within each county, school funds had to be 
apportioned so as to provide "as nearly as practicable, school terms of equal duration . . .  " in 
each school. [Alabama, 1940, p. 4163.] Even Mississippi at least formally guaranteed a 
minimum term length for every school in the state, black and white. [Preston, 1892, pp. 14-
15.] 
Federal and state judges enforced such provisions inconsistently, often deferring to 
flagrantly inegalitarian state legislatures. [Kousser, 1986.] But black citizens did bring 
cases, apparently without reprisal, did manage to secure highly qualified counsel, and did 
win important victories against the grossest racial inequities.14 In Kentucky in 1883, for
instance, a federal judge declared that the Fourteenth Amendment "must and can only mean 
that the laws of the states must be equal in their benefit as well as equal in their burdens, 
and that less would not be 'the equal protection of the laws."' [Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 
Fed. 297 (1883).] Accordingly, he ruled a law providing that taxes paid by whites would be 
spent only on white schools unconstitutional. Three years later the North Carolina Supreme 
Court threw out a similar law primarily on the grounds that it violated that state's 
constitutional mandate that, except for segregation, "there shall be no discrimination in favor 
of or to the prejudice of either race" in public schools. [Puitt v. Gaston County, 94 N.C. 709 
(1886).] In the same period, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided that school boards must 
operate black schools for the same terms as white schools. No school board, the Court 
13 This provision was construed quite strictly in, for instance, Elsberry v. Seay, 83 Ala. 614.
For similar laws or constitutional provisions, see, e.g., Hanford, 1878, p. 82; Skillman, 1928, 
pp. 203-06. 
14 In northern states, blacks often won the right to attend integrated schools. See Kousser,
1986, 1991. 
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declaimed, had the right to single out children "by the arbitrary standard of color, and 
deprive them of the benefits of the school privilege." [Maddox v. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (1885).] 
Legal overtones of Myrdal's American Creed reverberated even in the South, and that 
rhetoric was by no means wholly empty, even in the darkest periods of southern racism. 
The interplay of the American Creed, white supremacist ideology, and constitutional 
protections is perhaps nowhere more clearly in evidence than in the 1899 annual report of 
South Carolina state education superintendent John J. McMahan, who had been a prominent 
member of the state's 1895 constitutional convention and a stalwart proponent of the 
disfranchisement of blacks and poor whites there. [McMahan, 1900. ] "The principle of 
public education," McMahan proclaimed, "means that the State will not allow the 
unfortunate circumstances of parents to doom the children to grow up to life's 
responsibilities without training and without enlightenment. . . . The State cannot 
consistently omit any from this care. . . . The State is a unit, and must care for all her 
members. The welfare of the whole is dependent upon the welfare of every part." (pp. 21-
22.] Yet McMahan favored only a limited public education for African-Americans: "The 
elements of reading, writing and arithmetic are valuable to every human being, but beyond 
these the ordinary school branches are of far less value to a negro than habits of industry 
and the learning of a trade. The best type of the negro of intelligence and character is a 
mechanic educated in that best of schools--the well governed plantation before the [Civil ] 
War." [p.14, capitalization as in original.] Still, McMahan opposed separating property and 
poll taxes by race and funding black schools with black taxes alone: "Even if this plan, 
some times suggested, were not unconstitutional, it is wrong in principle. The State as a 
whole must provide the right sort of education for the negroes in her jurisdiction." [p.9. ]15
Two years later, McMahan's Florida counterpart, William N. Sheats, raised the rhetorical 
stakes even higher: "I sincerely believe [that ] to leave the negro in ignorance would be 
suicidal to the South, and to declare by any action a policy of opposition to the education of 
this people would discountenance the section before all enlightened people of the world, not 
to mention the moral and religious principles involved in the sight of God." [Sheats, 1903, 
pp. 448-50.] Although the American Creed and the various state and national laws and 
constitutional provisions did not fulfill the promise of equality or wipe out prejudice, they 
did set limits on inequality. Politics, the Constitution, and national ideals mattered, even to 
American racists. 
15 For an extensive discussion of the unconstitutionality of racially separate taxation, see
Alabama, 1940, pp. 4163, 4274-4310. 
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Table 1 
Net Number Migrating by Decade, by Race, 1870-1950 (00 omitted) 
State 1870s 1880s 1890s 
White Black w B w B 
AL -406 -390 -111 -135 -575 -106 
AR 579 294 312 447 -1079 -99 
FL 77 22 251 104 103 271 
GA -319 -211 -322 162 -331 -228 
LA -190 -45 -105 -75 104 -257 
MS -398 118 -567 -258 -452 -205 
NC 80 -56 -27 -351 -265 -340 
SC 153 158 -12 -119 -3 -501 
TN -742 -224 -497 -151 -616 -140 
TX 2529 83 854 -10 657 -27 
VA -222 -475 -466 -632 -364 -855 
State 1900s 1910s 1920s 
w B w B w B 
AL -313 -219 -354 -750 -649 -751 
AR -754 171 -827 -2 -1845 -671 
FL 474 398 910 -79 2266 531 
GA -220 -193 -12 -662 -1506 -2542 
LA 130 -251 -101 -468 -121 -430 
MS -214 -349 -781 -1302 -290 -820 
NC -488 -173 -375 -200 256 -88 
SC 12 -536 40 -604 -448 -1950 
TN -1147 -282 -783 -250 -754 -80 
TX 16 -341 -630 -55 1067 -146 
VA -169 -238 84 -105 -920 -1008 
State 1930s 1940s 
w B w B 
AL -931 -532 -995 -1637 
AR -1144 -426 -2292 -1298 
FL 2011 436 4388 -1 
GA -170 -635 -216 -1767 
LA 168 -64 -119 -1223 
MS -212 -517 -937 -2584 
NC -106 c545 -758 -1301 
SC 49 -674 -133 -1490 
TN 94 150 -396 -350 
TX -779 106 949 -788 
VA 716 -91 2060 -144 
1 5  
Source: Computed by averaging the "census survival" and "state of birth" 
estimates in Tables 1.11 and 1.15 in Simon Kuznets and Dorothy Swain Thomas, 
Population Redistribution and Economic Growth. (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1957), Vol. I. 
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Table 2 
Net Percentage Migrating by Decade, by Race, 1870-1950 
State 1870s 1880s 1890s 1900s 
White Black w B w B w B 
AL -7.0 -7.3 -1.5 -2.2 -6.4 -1.4 -2.8 -2.5 
AR +12.4 +17.6 +4.5 +17.2 -12.5 -3.0 -7.4 +4.2 
FL +6.8 +2.0 +14.7 +7.1 +4.3 +13.8 +13.8 +14.9 
GA -4.5 -3.3 -3.7 +2.1 -3.1 -2.4 -1. 7 -1.8 
LA -5.4 -1.1 -2.3 -1.5 +1.8 -4.3 +1.7 -3.7 
MS -9.5 +2.2 -1 1.3 -3.7 -7.7 -2.5 -3.1 -3.7 
NC +1.1 -1.2 -0.3 -6.4 -2.3 -5.8 -3.6 -2.6 
SC +4.6 +3.1 0.0 -1.9 0.0 -6.8 0.0 -6.6 
TN -7.3 -6.2 -4.1 -3.6 -4.4 -3.1 -7.2 -5.9 
TX +31.9 +2.6 +6.4 0.0 +3.4 0.0 0.0 -5.2 
VA -2.8 -8.3 -5.0 -10.0 -3.4 -13.2 -1.3 -3.6 
State 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 
w B w B w B w B 
AL -2.7 -8.3 -4.2 -8.2 -5.3 -5.5 -5.1 -16.7 
AR -7.0 0 -14.1 -14.5 -8.1 -8.9 -15.7 -28.6 
FL +18.l -2.6 +28.9 +14.1 +17.6 +9.3 +26.2 0 
GA 0 -5.6 -8.7 -22.4 -0.1 -5.9 -1.0 -16.5 
LA -1.1 -6.7 -2.1 -5.9 +1.2 -0.8 -0.8 -14.1 
MS -9.7 -13.4 -3.2 -8.4 +2.0 -5.0 -8.3 -25.1 
NC -2.3 -2.8 +1.3 -1.1 -0.5 -5.7 -2.7 -12.7 
SC +0.5 -7.1 -5.l -23.5 +0.5 -8.4 -1.1 -18.2 
TN -4.4 -5.4 -3.8 -1.8 +0.4 +3.1  -1.6 -6.7 
TX -1.9 -0.8 +2.6 -1.3 -1.6 +1.1 +1.6 -8.3 
VA +0.6 -1.5 -5.5 -15.0 +3.8 -1.4 +9.1 -2.l 
Source: Computed by averaging the "census survival" and "state of birth" 
estimates in Tables 1.12 and 1.15 in Simon Kuznets and Dorothy Swain 
Thomas, Population Redistribution 8 Economic Growth (Philadelphia: 
The American Philosophical Society, 1957) Vol. I.
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Table 3 
Expenditures Per Cl1ild in Scl1oolage Population, By Race 
State 1880 1885 1890 
w B w B w B 
AL na na 1.28 1.10 1.09 0.92 
AR na 
FL na na na na na na 
GA na na na na na na 
LA na na '5.42 '2.13 '4.68 '2.21 
MS na na na na 3.00 1.17 
NC 0.72 0.74 0.93 0.98 1.07 0.94 
SC na na na na na na 
TN na 
TX na # 1.15 #o.79 #3.68 #2.89 
VA na na na na 2.39 1.13 
1895 1900 1905 1910 
w B w B w B w B 
AL '2.32 '1.40 1.39 0.54 2.85 0.67 6.21 1.02 
AR na 
FL 5,85 2.35 6.66 2.24 #6.77 #J.50 12.14 2.99 
GA '2.23 '1.06. '2.86 'l.36 '4.58 '1.81 7.90 1.05 
LA '5.19 '1.67 5.57 0.87 5.39 0.61 8.74 0.91 
MS 3.43 1.26 3.44 1.14 '6.01 '1.94 5.03 1.07 
NC 1.17 1.02 1.22 1.14 1.98 1.17 3.70 1.49 
SC '2.96 '1.02 '5.49 '1.30 na na #•8.31 #• J.58 
TN na 
TX #4.88 #3.26 #6.28 #4.49 #6.96 #4.59 #9.32 #4.79 
VA na na 2.74 1.28 4.04 1.70 11.19 3.30 
18 
State 1915# 
w B 
AL 9.41 1.78 
AR 12.95 4.59 
FL 11.50 2.64 
GA 9.58 1.76 
LA 13.73 1.31 
MS 10.60 2.26 
NC 5.27 2.02 
SC 10.00 1.44 
TN 8.27 4.83 
TX 10.08 5.74 
VA 9.64 2.74 
State 1930. 
w B 
AL 37.50 7.16 
AR 26.91 17.06 
FL 78.25 10.57 
GA 31.52 6.98 
LA 40.64 7.84 
MS 31.33 5.94 
NC 44.48 14.30 
SC 52.89 5.20 
TN 46.52 31.54 
TX 46.71 39.66 
VA 47.46 13.30 
State 1947-8 ..
w B 
AL 122.98 74.97 
AR 103.29 59.57 
FL 177.38 112.70 
GA 126.87 58.73 
LA na na 
MS 114.74 23.82 
NC 113.80 96.39 
SC 146.42 67.62 
TN na na 
TX na na 
VA na na 
1920# 
w B 
9.83 1.52 
11.67 4.33 
1935# 
w B 
17.88 5.65 
13.59 5.16 
36.16 11.65 
19.77 5.04 
23.85 6.05 
22.34 4.72 
19.10 11.24 
23.77 5.19 
na na 
28.08 14.42 
22.72 10.35 
1951-2 ..
w B 
127.72 102.25 
102.05 67.75 
195.01 153.24 
163.76 110.39 
na na 
117.43 35.27 
152.20 128.67 
159.34 95.65 
na na 
na na 
na na 
19 
1925# 
w B 
15.91 3.22 
22.04 8.18 
1941-2 
w B 
41.17 11.84 
34.52 12.89 
80.17 24.76 
46.14 12.57 
66.28 14.21 
44.32 8.77 
47.28 25.25 
55.91 12.81 
na na 
67.04 34.58 
na na 
Sources: 
1880-1910: Computed from data in reports of state superintendents of schools in each state. 
1915: Thomas Jesse Jones, Negro Education (NY: Arno Press, reprint ed., 1969), II, 10. 
1920, 1925: Horace Mann Bond, The Education of the Negro in the American Social Order 
(NY: Octagon Books, reprint ed., 1970), 153-56. 
1930: Henry Allen Bullock, A History of Negro Education in the South (Cambridge: Harvard 
U. Press, 1967), 180. 
1935-48: U.S. Office of Education, Biennial Survey of Education in the U.S. (Washington: 
GPO, serial). 
1951-52: John Ansley Griffin, "Biracial Education in the South: A Study in Social Change" 
(unpub. Ph.D. Diss.: U. of Wisc., 1956). 
Notes 
• 
•• 
# 
na 
expenditures/ enrollment 
expenditures/average daily attendance 
includes funds for salaries only · 
not available 
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Name 
/3 
ENC 
EX 
EXC 
L 
LCH 
B,W 
(dates) 
t 
u 
Table 4 
Variable and Equatio11 Defi11itions for Tables 5wl2 
Definition 
Slope coefficient 
Percentage Change in Enrollment in Schools 
Expenditures Divided by Enrollment or Population 
Change in Expenditures or Salaries Divided by Enrollment or Population 
Length of School Term 
Change in Length of School Term 
Black or White Schools or Students 
Years-e.g., 0510 = Change from 1905 to 1910 
Time period ( = 1, 2 ... 6) 
error term 
Sources: All statistics in subsequent tables are computed from data in the reports of state 
superintendants of education. 
"t" statistics are in parentheses. 
All variables are weighted by enrollment by race. 
Equations A: ENCE12-t1 =intercept +(/])EX En+ u 
Equations B: EXCEt3-t2 =intercept +(/])ENCE,,_,, 
Equations C: EXE.,= intercept +(/3)ENCEt2-tl 
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Table 5 
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Louisiana, 1885-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant (J Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCE 0510 -0.03(-0.28) 0.09(2.24) EXE 05 
ENCE 9905 -0.20(-1.65) 0.05(1.02) EXE 99 
ENCE 9599 0.05(0.59) 0.04(1.23) EXE 95 
ENCE 9095 -0.10(-0.41) 0.20(1 .94) EXE 90 
ENCE 8590 -0.16(-0.91)  0.14(1.99) EXE 85 
ENCW 0510 0.27(5.30) 0.00(0.69) EXW 05 
ENCW 9905 0.19(3.40) -0.00(-0.53) EXW 99 
ENCW 9599 0.17(2.03) 0.00(0.54) EXW 95 
ENCW 9095 0.23(1.46) 0.04(1.53) EXW 90 
ENCW 8590 0.13(1.07) -0.00(-0.08) EXW 85 
Equations E 
EXCE 0510 0.46(3.12) 0.46(1 .42) ENCE 9905 
EXCE 9905 -0.35(-2.08) 0.26(0.62) ENCE 9599 
EXCE 9599 0.42(1.82) 0.16(0.64) ENCE 9095 
EXCE 9095 -0.60(-2.81) 0.63(2.13) ENCE 8590 
EXCW 0510 3.72(9.47) 0. 15(0.13) ENCW 9905 
EXCW 9905 -0.74(-0.92) 2.61(1.50) ENCW 9599 
EXCW 9599 2.90(4.36} -0.57(-0.68) ENCW 9095 
EXCW 9095 3.23(3.75) -2.38(-1.35) ENCW 8590 
Equations C 
EXE 10 2.40(9.37) 0.54(1.01) ENCE 0510 
EXE 05 2.03(9.40) -0.49(-1.02) ENCE 9905 
EXE 99 2.50(13.79) -0.55(-1.22) ENCE 9599 
EXE 95 2.24( 10.01) -0 .40(-1. 70) ENCE 9095 
EXE 90 2.55(12.35) -0.55(-1.92) ENCE 8590 
EXW 10 13.61(18.72) -2.28(-1 .31 )  ENCW 0510 
EXW05 10.02(14.04) -2.97(-1.43) ENCW 9905 
EXW 99 9.92(7.12) -1.65(-0.55) ENCW 9599 
EXW 95 8.50(7.68) -1.89(-1.34) ENCW 9095 
EXW 90 6.78(14. 1 1 )  -4.02(-4.09) ENCW 8590 
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Table 6 
E11rollment and Expenditure Changes i11 Mississippi, 1890-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant (3 Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCE 0510 0.17(2.77) -0.04(-1.36) EXE 05 
ENCE 9905 0.20(3.65) -0.03(-0.78) EXE 99 
ENCE 9599 0.04(0.32) -0.01(-0.13) EXE 95 
ENCE 9095 0.14(1 .42) -0.05(-0.65) EXE 90 
ENCW 0510 0.09(1.59) 0.00(0.03) EXW 05 
ENCW 9905 0.23(3.33) -0.02(-1.06) EXW 99 
ENCW 9599 0.08(1.86) -0.01(-1.04) EXW 95 
ENCW 9095 0.03(0.38) 0.01(0.44) EXW 90 
Equations B 
EXCE 0510 -0.73(-5.77) -0.81(-1.95) ENCE 9905 
EXCE 9905 1 . 15(13.81) 0.02(0.05) ENCE 9599 
EXCE 9599 -0.15(-1.18) -0.20(-0.32) ENCE 9095 
EXCW 0510 -0.99(-2.46) 0.97(0.68) ENCW 9905 
EXCW 9905 4.01(11.88) -0.89(-0.41) ENCW 9599 
EXCW 9599 -0.56(-3.81) -0.17(-0.26) ENCW 9095 
Equations C 
EXE 10 1.29(14.62) -0.39(-0.79) ENCE 0510 
EXE 05 2.13(21.54) 0.18(0.57) ENCE 9905 
EXE 99 1 . 1 1 (9.35) 0.34(0.63) ENCE 9599 
EXE 95 1.26(35.28) 0.01 (0.08) ENCE 9095 
EXW 10 6.03(15.98) -1.83(-0.84) ENCW 0510 
EXW 05 6.58(12.24) 0.36(0.19) ENCW 9905 
EXW 99 2.90(15. 75) -0.23(-0.20) ENCW 9599 
EXW 95 3.34( 16.85) 0.53(0.61) ENCW 9095 
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Table 7 
E11rollrnent and Expe11diture Cl1anges in Alabama, 1885-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant f3 Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCB 0510 -0.19(-1.50) 0.30( 4.92) EXB 05 
ENCB 9905 -0.20(-1.73) 0.07(0.92) EXB 99 
ENCB 9599 -0.06(-0.86) 0.06(1.41) EXB 95 
ENCB 9095 -0.48(-5.20) 0.25(5.27) EXB 90 
ENCB 8590 0.23(2.22) 0.01(0.32) EXB 85 
ENCW 0510 0.24(2. 76) 0.01(0.52) EXW 05 
ENCW 9905 0.01(0.19) 0.04(2.25) EXW 99 
ENCW 9599 -0.01(-0.28) 0.01(0.34) EXW 95 
ENCW 9095 -0.38(-2.92) 0.26(3.72) EXW 90 
ENCW 8590 0.38( 4.53) -0.06(-1.59) EXW 85 
Equations B 
EXCB 0510 0.35(2.07) 1.06(2.72) ENCB 9905 
EXCB 9905 0.60( 4.16) 0.73(1.09) ENCB 9599 
EXCB 9599 -0.12(-2.26) 0.47(2.37) ENCB 9095 
EXCB 9095 -0.83(-6.40) 1.06(3.25) ENCB 8590 
EXCW 0510 3.49(7.92) 3.63(2.72) ENCW 9905 
EXCW 9905 1.97(6.81) 2.05(1.56) ENCW 9599 
EXCW 9599 0.20(0.81)  -0.11(-0.12) ENCW 9095 
EXCW 9095 0.36(2.22) -0.15(-0.37) ENCW 8590 
Equations C 
EXB IO 2. 10(8.92) 0.31(0.92) ENCB 0510 
EXB 05 1.85(12.62) -0.79(-2.36) ENCB 9905 
EXB 99 1.31(13.02) -0.34(-0.77) ENCB 9599 
EXB 95 1.43(13.71) -0 .46(-1 .19) ENCB 9095 
EXB 90 2.16(20. 79) -1.04(-3.96) ENCB 8590 
EXW 10 8.69(9.85) -0.14(-0.07) ENCW 0510 
EXW 05 4.30(12.90) 1.18(1.16) ENCW 9905 
EXW 99 2.51(7.70) -2.92(-1.97) ENCW 9599 
EXW 95 2.34(10.03) -0.16(-0.18) ENCW 9095 
EXW90 2.06(28. 77) -0.69(-3.82) ENCW 8590 
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Table 8 
Enrollment and Term Length Changes in Alabama, 1895-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant (3 Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCB 0510 0.09(0.16) 0.00(0.50) LB 05 
ENCB 9905 -0 .30(-1.07) 0.00(0.70) LB 99 
ENCB 9599 0.01(0.02) 0.00(0.36) LB 95 
ENCW 0510 0.25(1.06) 0.00(0.12) LW 05 
ENCW 9905 -0.12(-0.63) 0.00(1.27) LW 99 
ENCW 9599 0.03(0.52) -0.00(-0.58) LW 95 
Equations B 
LCHB 0510 -128(-0.71) -2.58(-0.61) ENCB 9905 
LCHB 9905 28.60(15.86) -3.37(-0.43) ENCB 9599 
LCHB 9599 -19.61(-3.46) 1.70(0.08) ENCB 9095 
LCHW 0510 24.23(11.30) 2.14(0.34) ENCW 9905 
LCHW 9905 29.93(15.45) 16.61(1.88) ENCW 9599 
LCHW 9599 -25.13(-3.41) -43.78(-1.57) ENCW 9095 
Equations C 
LB 10 91.33(37.81) 9.13(2.61) ENCB 0510 
LB 05 95.66(50.10) 5.97(1.34) ENCB 9905 
LB 99 66.81(35.03) -1.7.7(-0.21) ENCB 9599 
LB 95 86.04(14.80) 1.58(0.07) ENCB 9095 
LW 10 128.14(39.17) 9.98(1.25) ENCW 0510 
LW 05 104.68(40.65) 7.56(0.99) ENCW 9905 
LW 99 75.17(31.99) -7.31(-0.68) ENCW 9599 
LW 95 llJ0.49(13.11) 42.51(1.46) ENCW 9095 
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Table 9 
Enrollment and Expenditures Changes in Georgia, 1895-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant /3 Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCB 0510 0.14 (2.12) -0.05(-1.46) EXB 05 
ENCB 0005 0.15(2.13) -0.02(-0.54) EXB 00 
ENCB 9500 0.23(3.53) -0.09(-1.96) EXB 95 
ENCW 0510 0.05(0.94) -0.01(-0.80) EXW 05 
ENCW 0005 0.09(0.67) 0.02(0.59) EXW OO 
ENCW 9500 0.01(0.22) 0.01(1.02) EXW 95 
Equations B 
EXCB 0510 0.13(0.92) 0.73(1.46) ENCB 0005 
EXCB 0005 0.27(3.22) 0.46(1.66) ENCB 9500 
EXCW 0510 1.60(7.98) 2.13(2.05) ENCW 0005 
EXCW 0005 3.93(5.43) 11.27(5.78) ENCW 9500 
Equations C 
EXB 10 0.98(2.65) 7.05(7.11) ENCB 0510 
EXB 05 1.89(22.38) -0.11(-0,35) ENCB 0005 
EXB 00 1.76(31.38) -0.50(-2.87) ENCB 9500 
EXW 10 9.17(17.50) -8.48(-5.49) ENCW 0510 
EXW 05 4.95(17.51) 0.07(0.09) ENCW 0005 
EXW 00 3.63(23.63) -0.16(-0.20) ENCW 9500 
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Table 10 
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in Florida, 1896-1910 
Dependent \'ariable 
ENCB 0510 
ENCB 0005 
ENCB 9600 
ENCW 0510 
ENCW 0005 
ENCW 9600 
EXCB 0510 
EXCB 0005 
EXCW 0510 
EXCW 0005 
EXB 10 
EXB 05 
EXB 00 
EXW 10 
EXW 05 
EXW 00 
Constant (3 
Equations A 
-0.02(-0.37) 
0.12(1.09) 
-0.56(-14.20) 
-0.01(-0.10) 
0.21(1.91) 
0.19(1.64) 
0.06(1.42) 
0.03(0.82) 
-0.04(-4.81) 
0.01(0.96) 
0.01(0.41) 
-0.01 (-0.60) 
Equations B 
1.40( 4.80) 
0.42(0.62) 
5.53(4.11) 
0.54(1.20) 
0.54(0.70) 
2.03(2.23) 
-0.48(-0.15) 
-2.72(-1.56) 
Equations C 
2.95(8.68) 
1.39(9. 75) 
-0.87(-0.98) 
12.17(9.69) 
6.88(13.35) 
6.40(10.67) 
27 
0.98(0.54) 
0.22(0.59) 
-5.01(-4.18) 
1.50(0.27) 
0.16(0.12) 
2.53(1.10) 
Independent Variable 
EXB 05 
EXB 00 
EXB 96 
EXW 05 
EXW 00 
EXW 96 
ENCB 0005 
ENCB 9600 
ENCW 0005 
ENCW 9600 
ENCB 0510 
ENCB 0005 
ENCB 9600 
ENCW 0510 
ENCW 0005 
ENCW 9600 
Table 11 
Enrollment and Expenditure Changes in North Carolina, 1880-1910 
Dependent Variable Constant f3 Independent Variable 
Equations A 
ENCB 0510 -0.24(-1.75) 0.16(1.51) EXB 05 
ENCB 0005 0.23(3.60) 0.02(0.12) EXB 00 
ENCB 9500 -0.08(-0.77) 0.13(1.26) EXB 95 
ENCB 9095 0.18(1.61) -0.06(-0.54) EXB 90 
ENCB 8590 0.04(0. 73) -0.03(-0. 73) EXB 85 
ENCB 8085 0. 12(0. 70) -0.04(-0.20) EXB 80 
ENCW 0510 0.03(0.71) 0.03(1.58) EXW 05 
ENCW 0005 0.10(1.91) 0.02(0.61) EXW 00 
ENCW 9500 0.05(-0.50) 0.17(2.35) EXW 95 
ENCW 9095 0.36(2.87) -0.15(-1.34) EXW 90 
ENCW 8590 0.25(3.41) -0.12(-1.95) EXW 85 
ENCW 8085 -0.15(-1.06) 0.23(1.30) EXW 80 
Equations B 
EXCB 0510 0.32( 4.40) -0.32(-1.65) ENCB 0005 
EXCB 0005 0.14(3.35) 0.09(0.54) ENCB 9500 
EXCB 9500 0.00(0.06) 0.04(0.37) ENCB 9095 
EXCB 9095 0.08(2.26) 0.04(0.34) ENCB 8590 
EXCB 8590 -0.27(-2.32) -0.54(-1.86) ENCB 8085 
EXCW 0510 0.98(8.82) 0.40(0.76) ENCW 0005 
EXCW 0005 0.72(9.61) 0.10(0.41) ENCW 9500 
EXCW 9500 0.24(5.42) -0.04(-0.33) ENCW 9095 
EXCW 9095 0.13(2.84) -0.13(-0.70) ENCW 8590 
EXCW 8590 0.02(0.39) -0.26(-1.66) ENCW 8085 
Equations C 
EXB 10 1.39(29.62) 0.06(0.41) ENCB 0510 
EXB 05 1.21(31.79) 0.16(1.08) ENCB 0005 
EXB 00 1 .06(34.79) 0.04(0.36) ENCB 9500 
EXB 95 1.10(27.31) -0.23(-1.78) ENCB 9095 
EXB 90 0.91 (27.42) -0.02(-0.18) ENCB 8590 
EXB 85 1.28(11.26) 0.41(1.43) ENCB 8085 
EXW 10 
,. 
3.15(18.96) 0.95(0.95) ENCW 0510 
EXW 05 2.13(20.64) 0.58(1.18) ENCW 0005 
EXW 00 1.37(24.27) 0.36(1.96) ENCW 9500 
EXW 95 1.26(21.46) -0.19(-1.21) ENCW 9095 
EXW 90 1.08(16.47) 0.35(1.26) ENCW 8590 
EXW 85 1.10(24.96) 0.33(2.64) ENCW 8085 
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Table 12 
E11roll1ne11t and Expe11diture Cl1anges in Virginia, 1890-1910 
Dependent Variable 
ENCB 0510 
ENCB 0105 
ENCB 9001 
ENCW 0510 
ENCW 0105 
ENCW 9001 
EXCB 0510 
EXCB 0105 
EXCW 0510 
EXCW 0105 
EXB 10 
EXB 05 
EXB 01 
EXW 10 
EXW 05 
EXW 01 
Constant f3 
Equations A 
0.10(3.04) 
-0.05(-1.44) 
-0.25(-6.94) 
-0.03(-1.44) 
-0.07(-1.69) 
0.12(1.65) 
-0.05(-2.82) 
-0.01(-0.39) 
-0.01(-0.50) 
0.03(5.75) 
0.03(2.08) 
-0.06(-2.30) 
Equations B 
3.09(12.58) 
0.41(3.96) 
8.39(19.01) 
1.03(13.20) 
1.92(1.21) 
0.04(0.12) 
10.95(3.44) 
0.99(3.13) 
Equations C 
3.35(19.23) 
1.74(21.32) 
1.32(10.00) 
7.98(14.86) 
3.86(28.35) 
2.66(28.44) 
-0.09(-0.07) 
0.07(0.14) 
0.06(0.14) 
34.44(7.91) 
3.47(3.54) 
0.05(0.12) 
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Independent Variable 
EXB 05 
EXB 01 
EXB 90 
EXW 05 
EXW 01 
EXW 90 
ENCB 0105 
ENCB 9001 
ENCW 0105 
ENCW 9001 
ENCB 0510 
ENCB 0105 
ENCB 9001 
ENCW 0510 
ENCW 0105 
ENCW 9001 
